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Phenomenology as
Eschatological Materialism
Neal DeRoo, Dordt College

T

he ‘theological’ turn in phenomenology has proven somewhat
controversial, both within phenomenology1 and for theology.2 Given
that phenomenology is allegedly concerned with the ‘things themselves,’
and that theology is concerned with speaking about God, how can
phenomenology speak about theological matters without making God
a ‘thing,’ the object of an experience, thereby missing, perhaps, what is
essential about God? On this thinking, ‘theological’ phenomenology either
renders God an object able to be studied phenomenologically, in which
case it is unorthodoxly theological; or, it leaves God, the ‘object’ of its
phenomenological investigation, non-objectified, thereby rendering the
movement insufficiently phenomenological.
In this paper, I will try to circumvent the second claim and, by so doing,
hope to contribute something to the first claim as well. That is, by showing
how ‘theological’ phenomenology is in fact rigorously phenomenological,
I hope to prove not only its phenomenological weight, but also to show
where it might make contributions to theological discourse. To do this,
I will examine a major thread of ‘theological’ phenomenology: the turn
to eschatology.3 While eschatology has become a major talking point in
‘theological’ phenomenology—from Kearney’s micro-eschatology to
Lacoste’s parousia, Marion’s Eucharistic eschatology and even, perhaps,

1. The most famous example of this controversy in phenomenology is perhaps Dominique
Janicaud’s “The Theological Turn of French Phenomenology,” trans. Bernard G. Prusak, in
Janicaud, et. al., Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn” (New York: Fordham University
Press, 2000), 16–103.
2. As evidenced by, e.g., Radical Orthodoxy’s sometimes difficult reception of phenomenological
figures; cf., e.g., John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford,
UK and Cambridge, USA: Blackwell, 1990).
3. Cf. DeRoo and Manoussakis, (eds.), Phenomenology and Eschatology: Not yet in the Now
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009) for a series of examinations of this theme.
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Caputo’s Messianic—its roots lay, not in theological accounts of the
eschaton, but in the phenomenological exploration of time. To begin,
then, we must root eschatology firmly in phenomenology’s understanding
of time. In doing so, we will come to see that not only is eschatology an
essential aspect of phenomenological time, but that it thereby proves to
be essential to properly understanding time-consciousness, and therefore
intentionality, that major breakthrough of phenomenology (Section I). Given
the necessity of eschatology to intentionality, and hence to phenomenology
itself, one cannot argue that eschatology is added to phenomenology from
outside, but rather one can see that it is essentially phenomenological.
As essentially phenomenological, however, it necessarily is at odds with
a certain materialism that seems to be gaining credence, not only in the
natural sciences, but in the general culture at large. By infusing the material
with the immaterial (and vice versa), phenomenological intentionality not
only goes beyond the Cartesian dualism that still characterizes our common
sense understanding of materialism, but it also introduces the idea of an
eschatological materialism that accords nicely with theological accounts
of created reality and recent investigations of the possibility of religious
materialism (Section II). Hence phenomenology reveals itself to be an
essentially eschatological materialism in a way that is enlightening to both
philosophy and theology.

I. Phenomenology, Eschatology, Intentionality
For phenomenology, time is the essence of subjectivity: while all else
depends in part on stimulus from elsewhere, Husserl will argue, time alone
is constituted purely within the subject. For Husserl, this manifests itself
in the ‘empty’4 temporal formality of retention-impression-protention. This
complex phenomena is entirely formal: what is retained in a retention is the
previous protention, which is then fulfilled (even as it may be simultaneously
disappointed) by the conjunction of an impression and the simultaneous
retention of that previous protention. This conjunction, in turn, contains its
4. Edmund Husserl, Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und
Forschungsmanuskripten 1918–1926. Ed. M. Fleischer (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966),
128. Translated by Anthony J. Steinbock as Analyses concerning Active and Passive Synthesis:
Lectures on Transcendental Logic. (Dordrecht/Boston/ London: Kluwer Academic, 2001).
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own protention which must then be retained in the next instant as fulfillment
via an impression, and so on, to a certain infinity.5
But of course the temporality of our experience is not empty. Hence,
the impression provides the content (from the world) that is then retained and
which can be protended (or expected). However, this content must always
come to us within the structure (or strictures) of our formal temporality of
expectations, retentions and fulfillments. This is to say that our experience
must make sense to us by appealing, somehow, to two sets of horizons:
those of formal time-consciousness, and those of experiential expectation.
In this latter sense, it is only because what confronts us now reminds us of
previous similar situations that we are able to confront the present in a way
that makes sense, rather than as a raw jumble of senseless data: I see the
thing before me as a chair because previous experience habituates me to
encounter these kinds of objects as certain kinds of things (i.e., chairs) that
can be expected to have certain kinds of properties (e.g., three-dimensional
extension, ability to hold the weight of an average adult, etc.).
On this horizonal model, we can say that our temporality proceeds
directly from the past and present toward the future. The future here marks
that time which will at one point be the ‘now’ of experience, but is not yet.
That is, the future is some moment that has not yet come, but will come in a
sequential relationship to the present. This can be expressed mathematically
on the model of t +1, t + 2, … t +n.
But this is not the only sense of the future at work in phenomenological
conceptions of temporality. In addition to this idea of time as operating
within horizons, Levinas develops the notion of time as eschatological. This
invocation of eschatology emerges in Levinas’ attempt to take seriously
the Husserlian concepts of intentionality, impression, and sensation.6 In
its most basic form, eschatological time in phenomenology refers to the
necessity that the ‘closed’ system of internal time-constitution is acted upon
by that which comes from outside itself. Where Husserl limited this external
influence only to the constitution of the world and of judgments—thereby

5. Husserl discusses the nature of this infinity in Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das
Zeitbewusstsein (1917/1918). Ed. R. Bernet and D. Lohmar (Dordrecht/Boston/London:
Kluwer Academic, 2001), 277–278.
6. Cf. the essays in Levinas, Discovering Existence With Husserl, trans. Richard A. Cohen and
Michael B. Smith (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998).
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leaving inner time-constitution, the most basic level of the subject, intact—
Levinas sets out to show that even in its most basic self-constitution, the
subject is acted upon by alterity, by that which is wholly different than
itself. According to Levinas, the subject discovers that its relation to
its own internal time is not that of free constitution, but is rather that of
responsibility and alterity: I discover, in the ‘flow’ of my very basic lived
experience, that my subjectivity is not my own, but is rather a response to
a world that is always already endowed with sense by a (human) Other.
My very subjectivity—that is, my ability to make sense of the world as my
experience of the world—is not a self-given power, but is rather an ability I
have that results from a pre-primordial experience of relation to an Other.7
The eschatological conception of time in phenomenology then entails,
not a focus on a future time that remains yet to come (the ‘end times’ of the
eschaton, for example), but rather elaborates the fact that the very presentness of the present time is itself always already infused with a certain
relation to otherness that makes a purely-present present impossible.8
Eschatological time, in phenomenology, reminds us that the future is not
only something we are moving toward, but is something that constantly
interrupts the present right now. The future is not only that time which has
not yet come, but is also the aspect of the not-yet in the now9 that helps
shape and constitute the now.
This two-fold sense of the future allows temporality to constitute the
most basic element of subjectivity. On the one hand, the fact that I can
only make sense of things as they appear within my horizons of expectation
reveals the subject’s role in constituting the world. On the other hand,
those horizons of expectation are themselves constituted by the subject’s
relation to other people, and these relations, in turn, constitute the very
subjectivity of the subject itself (most notably, in the constitution of inner
7. To use an empirical example, the child’s ability to make sense of the world arises only
because it gains linguistic and semantic categories from its previous relations with other
people. We can make sense of the world only after we have learned to make sense from others.
8. This is the core of Derrida’s discussion of differance in Speech and Phenomena and
elsewhere.
9. Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917). Ed. R.
Boehm (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 77, 373. Translated by John Barnett Brough as
On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time. Dordrecht, Boston, and London:
Kluwer Academic, 1991.

Phenomenology as Eschatological Materialism… v 135
time-consciousness). Because temporality, as discussed by Husserl and
developed by Levinas, is a matter of both operating within horizons as well
as having those horizons already-been-shattered by the very thing that makes
them possible (i.e., the relation with alterity that enables the subject to make
sense of the world), temporality—with its futural focus—is able to achieve
the double-intentionality necessary for the phenomenological concept of
intentionality. Intentionality is the name given to the idea that consciousness
is always consciousness of… , and therefore that the knowing subject and
the known world are always already in contact. This can be the case only
if one act can simultaneously constitute the subject and the world, thereby
entailing that their connection precedes their distinction. As we have seen,
this act is achieved in the two-fold account of temporality, and therefore it is
only because phenomenological time is both horizonal and eschatological
that intentionality can emerge from phenomenology. Eschatological time
is essential to the functioning and self-understanding of phenomenology.10

II. Intentionality and Materialism
So far, we have established that eschatology is an essential part
of phenomenology. From this, we can conclude that the recent ‘turn’ to
eschatology in phenomenology is not necessarily the result of some
‘swerve’ away from rigorous phenomenology, but could, instead, be
merely the making-explicit of phenomenology’s continued attempts at
self-understanding. That is, the eschatological focus of ‘theological’
phenomenology remains orthodoxly and rigorously phenomenological—
even as it suggests that phenomenology need not always be an objectifying
process.
How, then, can ‘theological’ phenomenology provide a point of
contact with general theological discourse? One answer, I think, lies in
phenomenology’s implicit rejection of reductive materialism in favour of
an eschatological materialism that fails to maintain the sharp distinction
between immaterial mind and material bodies. By claiming that both the
subject and the world are constituted in intentionality, phenomenology

10. I develop this in much more detail than is necessary here in Futurity in Phenomenology:
Promise and Method in Husserl, Levinas and Derrida (New York: Fordham University Press,
2012).
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rejects the claim that the (physical) world constitutes the subject, a claim
that is essential to the reductive materialist project.11 It does not, however,
reject materialism outright, in favour of a speculative idealism, for example.
Rather, phenomenology embraces the material precisely by viewing it in
essential relationship with the immaterial: there is no inert matter, divorced
from sense, except in abstraction. All matter, in experience and hence
in (lived) reality, is sense-imbued matter, that is, matter always already
infused with the immaterial; and all immaterial processes bear necessary
connections to the material. This reflexivity is what is meant when we say
that the subject and the world are both constituted—made sense of—in the
one act of intentionality.
This is not to say that there is no such thing as physical existence, nor
that such existence cannot be understood by way of chemical composition,
atomic structure, etc. It merely says that such existence is but one aspect or
avenue of sense that we can find in the world (or, perhaps better, one way in
which we can make sense of the world), but in no way a privileged or superior
mode of sense. Quite to the contrary, understanding the world in strictly
(reductively) materialist terms is very much a secondary and abstracted way
of seeing the world: it assumes something like the mathematical idealization
first proposed by Galileo in which the entire world comes to be judged, not
as it initially appears, but as it can be abstracted and ‘purified’ via scientific
and mathematical models.12 While useful, perhaps, for science (and this is
itself debatable), such a ‘scientific’ or ‘mathematical’ model of the world is
nonetheless a model, that is, an application or attribution of immaterial sense
in order to constitute the ‘material’ world: the objects of science are, in this
regard, ideal objects and not material objects at all. Like the ideal triangle
in geometry, the ‘thing itself’ (or the ‘way things are’) is a scientifically
useful model that is qualitatively distinct from the actual things in the world
(and, therefore, from the physical things in the laboratory also). And, as in
geometry, we must explicitly understand the relationship between ideal and
11. I have in mind here evolutionary reductionism, especially as it manifests itself in the work
of someone like Richard Dawkins (cf., for example, Dawkins, The Selfish Gene [Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1976]).
12. Cf. Edmund Husserl, Der Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die Phänomenologische Philosophe. Ed. W. Biemel (The
Hague: Matinus Nijhoff, 1954), §§ 8–9. Translated by David Carr as The Crisis of European
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.
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real objects if the developments occasioned by the study of the ideal objects
are to have any meaning whatsoever in the world at large.
Phenomenology, in contrast, strives to ensure that we remember not
only the difference but also the connection between ideal and real objects.
This is to say that phenomenology—with its notion of intentionality that
itself is premised, in part, on an eschatological view of time—maintains
that the notion of ‘pure’ matter is an ideal and abstract notion, and that all
real matter is in fact imbued with nonmaterial sense, just as all nonmaterial
sense has a material substrate.
But how does such a view help contribute to theology? I would suggest
that the picture of materialism that phenomenology provides appreciates
and deepens theological understandings of the world as created reality. By
viewing material as created, theology claims that the material world always
exhibits the divine wisdom or divine plan of its Creator.13 This is to say that
the ‘sense’ of the material world is not exhausted by its objective structure,
but rather that objective structure itself gains its sense only within a larger
model of the world and of reality. This, in turn, opens up a richer, more
diverse understanding of created reality itself, in which the objectivism of
reductive materialism is but one aspect or ‘mode’ of the created order.14
While this mode can be understood in distinction from other modes, this
is always in abstraction from its more natural, integrated nature. That is,
the differing modes of creation are best understood integrally, rather than
disjunctively, and this because their status as created entails a deeper sense
than mere material ‘stuff.’
This (phenomenologically) deepened account of created reality is
beneficial to theology in multiple ways. For one, this understanding of the
world will obviously be at odds with the materialism of the ‘New Atheism’
of Dawkins and Hitchens. But this critique can now be understood from
a scientific and not merely a theological perspective. This distinction is
13. Cf. Al Wolters, Creation Regained second edition (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005),
especially chapter 2, for more on the relationship between creation and divine wisdom.
14. For more on this idea of a ‘modal ontology,’ cf. Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of
Theoretical Thought trans. David H. Freeman and H. DeJongste (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij H. J.
Paris, and Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1955); cf. especially
volume 2, The General Theory of the Modal Spheres. The notion of a modal ontology also
emerges in the phenomology of Nicolai Hartmann; cf. Ontologie, (4 Volumes) (Berlin-Leipzig:
de Gruyter, 1935–1950).
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crucial here to the extent that the New Atheists tend to oppose religion to
science as one opposes childish superstition to adult critical thinking.15 By
showing that science (via phenomenology) does not support a reductive
materialism, but instead supports the more complex picture of an integrated
reality suggested by creational16 accounts of the world, phenomenology has
an apologetic value for theology.
Beyond this apologetic value, however, the deepened account of
created reality suggested by phenomenology also opens the door to a
positive theological recovery of materialism. Of course, this will no longer
be the reductive materialism of Dawkins et. al., but rather a spiritual,
religious, or theological materialism, where “spiritual” no longer indicates
a second kind of thing in contrast to the material (as it did for Descartes),
but rather indicates the complex dynamic of material and immaterial within
the material itself that is presented in phenomenology and in accounts of
creation. Indeed, some theologians will go so far as to say that reductive
materialism “is simply not as materialist as theological materialism.”17
The precise nature of this theological materialism varies widely, from the
neo-Platonic “participatory” materialism of John Milbank18 to the “kenotic”
materialism of Slavoj Žižek19 and Gianni Vattimo,20 from the “mode of

15. Cf., for example, Dawkins, The God Delusion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt), 350.
16. Which must be kept distinct from Creationist accounts, which view the first chapter of
Genesis as a scientific account of the origin of the world. By focusing on the modal complexity
of created reality, phenomenology helps point out the need to distinguish between different
senses (different intending acts, different modes of givenness, etc.) of the world. In this regard,
it suggests that Genesis might provide a theological account of the origin of the world that can
be true without trying to be a material account of the origin of the world; in this regard, we can
read Genesis 1 as theology without having to read it as pseudo-biology.
17. This is Milbank’s main claim in his debate with Žižek, staged in Milbank and Žižek, The
Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic? ed. Creston Davis (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009).
18. Cf. John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward, Radical Orthodoxy: A New
Theology (London: Routledge, 1999).
19. Cf. Milbank and Žižek, The Monstrosity of Christ.
20. Cf. Vattimo, After Christianity, trans. Luca d’Isanto (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2002).
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materialization” of Caputo21 to James K.A. Smith’s “logic of incarnation,”22
but all of these materialisms are at least partially rooted in both the
phenomenological tradition and in Christology and Trinitarian thought
(even if these things are re-imagined in non-traditional ways by some).
Indeed, this post-phenomenological resurgence of theology in relation to
materialism has manifested itself even in non-religious European thinkers
like Badiou and Agamben, whose recent dalliances with St. Paul have made
waves in both philosophical and theological circles.23
The critique and re-imagination of materialism, while particularly
relevant in the contemporary theological scene, is not the only way in
which phenomenology’s ‘theological’ turn has proven beneficial for
theology, however. The distinct nature of eschatology as it functions within
phenomenology takes a position in favour of certain theological accounts
of eschatology over others. By offering a two-fold account of temporality,
phenomenology provides a criticism of the temporality of t +n (in which
time moves always (and solely) from the past, through the present, to the
future) that undergirds, not just the reductive materialist position but also
dispensationalist and futurist accounts of the eschaton, which view it as
a historical fact that will one day be present (the way the present is here
right now), though that day has not yet come.24 By offering an alternative,
kairological conception of time, phenomenology offers a theory of
21. Cf. John D. Caputo, “The Return of Anti-Religion: From Radical Atheism to Radical
Theology,” Journal of Cultural and Religious Theory [Spring 2011], esp. § 15.
22. Cf. Smith, “The Logic of Incarnation: Toward a Catholic Postmodernism,” in DeRoo
and Lightbody (eds.), The Logic of Incarnation: James K.A. Smith’s Critique of Postmodern
Religion (Eugene: Pickwick, 2009), 3–37.
23. Cf. Badiou, St Paul: The Foundation of Universalism trans. Ray Brassier (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2003), and Agamben, The Time that Remains: A Commentary on
the Letter to the Romans trans. Patricia Dailey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).
For its reception in philosophical and theological circles, cf. Caputo and Alcoff (eds.), St. Paul
among the Philosophers (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009) and Milbank, Žižek
and Davis, Paul’s New Moment: Continental Philosophy and the Future of Christian Theology
(Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2010).
24. This understanding of the eschaton is often based on a “scientific” rather than theological
reading of the book of Revelation, and has its most popular (if not necessarily its most scholarly
rigorous) manifestation in the Left Behind series of novels written by Tim LaHaye and Jerry
B. Jenkins (published by Tyndale House, and now numbering 16 books with over 63 million
copies in print). Futurism, as a way of interpreting the book of Revelation, was inaugurated
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temporality that can help make sense of the eschatologies of figures like
Moltmann, Rahner, and Zizioulas who sought to make eschatology a key
aspect of theological thought in the 20th century.
On the horizonal temporality of t + n that phenomenology critiques,
the future provides nothing to the present, save, perhaps, the possibility of
hope or despair in regard to particular conditions. The past also has no value
for the present, except to show us how we arrived at one historical position
rather than another.25 This lack of historicality shows itself most clearly
in the view that truth can be judged atemporally, and that the historical
development of our ideas (e.g., in science) is less important than the
(eternal) validity of those ideas in the present. This theory of temporality
undergirds fundamentalism in its various guises, be they Christian, Islamic
or Scientistic.26 By critiquing this temporality, phenomenology not only
supports certain theological eschatologies over others but also suggests
new standards for truth in theological circles. These standards can be
broadly deemed eschatological, focusing on the structures of reality only
insofar as those structures are understood as dynamic. This is not merely
a process theology, but rather suggests a thoroughly complex, multiform
yet integrated picture of reality. This is to say, this theory of truth does not
presume that truth must build itself up (or unveil itself) slowly over time—
with the assumption still remaining, it seems, that the truth, so built up or
unveiled must be considered eternally valid (even if it must be temporally
indexed). Rather, this suggests that truth is, perhaps, not the kind of thing
(e.g., a proposition) that can be judged a-temporally, but instead requires a
thorough reimagining of what it means for something to be true.27 Just as
the notion of eschatology at work in phenomenology enables us to think of
eternity as the alterity inherent in presence (in addition to understanding

by Francisco Ribera with the publication in 1590 of his commentary on Revelation, entitled In
Sacrum Beati Ioannis Apostoli, & Evangelistiae Apocalypsin Commentarij.
25. This view underlies some of the more fundamentalist Protestant denominations’ view of
the sufficiency of Scripture without any need for tradition as an instrument of interpretation.
26. Gianni Vattimo argues against such a view of biblical interpretation—and in truth in
general—in favour of a more tradition-friendly account in After Christianity.
27. For one example of such a re-imagination of truth, cf. Lambert Zuidervaart, Artistic Truth:
Aesthetics, Discourse and Imaginative Disclosure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004).
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it as everlastingness), is also enables us to reconceive of truth along nonepistemic lines.28

Conclusion
The eschatological dimension of phenomenology deepens our
understanding of key phenomenological themes such as intentionality and
time-consciousness, and so reveals a non-objectifying manner of disclosure,
of being-constituted, that is necessarily at work in the phenomenological
domain. In doing so, not only does it show that ‘theological’ phenomenology
remains rigorously phenomenological, but it also opens the possibility
of a non-objectifying, but still phenomenological, exploration of God
that has significant insights for theology. This has enabled ‘theological’
phenomenology to not only engage with traditional theological tropes
(e.g., eschatology, creation, biblical interpretation), but also has helped
theology re-examine its accounts of materialism and truth in ways that
suggest new boundaries of theological discourse moving forward. In doing
so, ‘theological’ phenomenology, and its eschatological materialism, has
proven beneficial for both phenomenology and theology.

28. A project undertaken in theology by John D. Caputo in The Weakness of God: A Theology
of the Event (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).

